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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between the official and parallel exchange rates, in three
Caribbean countries, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad, during the 1985-1993 period using
cointegration, Granger causality, and reduced form methods.  The official and parallel rates are
cointegrated in all three countries, but with significant average disparity between them in
Guyana and Trinidad, which unlike Jamaica applied infrequent and large adjustments to their
official rates.  The causation is bi-directional in the case of Jamaica and uni-directional, with
changes in the official rate Granger causing changes in the parallel rate, in the cases of Guyana
and Trinidad, reflecting the difference in their official exchange rate policies.  Our reduced form
estimates indicate that exchange controls, expansionary fiscal and monetary policy, and changes
of government mostly have the expected positive effect on the black market premium.  After past
values of the premium, exchange controls exert the strongest impact on the premium.
Keywords: Foreign Exchange Controls, Black Market Exchange Rate, Black Market







Parallel or black markets for foreign currencies have become common phenomena in 
developing countries, with parallel exchange rates deviating, in some cases, considerably 
from the official rates. One common thread in the emergence of these parallel markets 
has been the imposition of foreign exchange controls.1 Malaysia's imposition of capital 
controls in the wake of the currency crisis it faced in 1997-8 has further pushed the use of 
foreign exchange controls back into the spotlight2. Where the degree of foreign currency 
rationing associated with foreign exchange controls is strong and the central bank does 
not have sufficient reserves to satisfy the demand for foreign currency parallel markets 
develop. Whatever gives rise to a parallel exchange rate, understanding its relationship 
with the official exchange rate is important,3 for example, for the success of any foreign 
exchange rate unification attempt.4  
In this paper we study the relationship between the parallel and official exchange 
rates for a sample of three Caribbean countries,5 Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad for the 
period 1985-1993 using Granger causality, cointegration, and reduced form methods. 
These countries had well-developed parallel markets and attempted unification of their 
parallel and official exchange rates during the sample period, but existing studies have 
                                                 
1 See for example, The Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions published by the 
IMF. 
2 See Fortune Magazine, Sept. 1998, pp. 35-36. 
3 This relationship has been studied by, among others, Lizondo (1987), Culbertson (1989), Pinto (1989, 
1991), Kharas and Pinto (1989), Agenor and Flood (1992), Montiel et al. (1993), Noorbakhsh and 
Shahrokhi (1993), Bessler and Yu (1994), Ghei, Kiguel and O’Connell (1995), Goldberg (1995), Chotigeat 
and Theerathorn (1996), Odedukun (1996), Ashworth et al. (1999), Gelbard and Nagayasu (1999), Apergis 
(2000), Baliamoune (2001), and Phylaktis and Girardin (2001) for various samples of (developing) 
countries.   
4 The effects of an official devaluation and stabilizations policies and the outcome of any policy targeting 
the official rate all hinge upon this understanding as well. 
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not considered any of them. While they were fundamentally similar at the onset of their 
political independence in the 1960s, their differences in economic policies and 
fortunes/misfortunes set them apart soon thereafter rendering them further interesting for 
our analysis.6  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our 
choice of methodology and the hypotheses that are tested by them, and our choice of 
sample and data sources. In section 3 we test for a long run relationship between the 
parallel and official exchange rates in each country using stationarity and cointegration 
analysis; and for the direction of causation between their two rates using Granger 
causality analysis. In section 4 we study the determinants of their parallel market premia 
using reduced form regression models. Our concluding remarks are presented in section 
5. 
 
2. Tested Hypotheses, Methodology, Choice of Sample, and Data Sources 
The theoretical framework underlying our empirical analysis is one of monetary approach 
to exchange rate determination. A framework in which expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policy mixes, as in monetized budget deficits, in the presence of foreign exchange 
controls render the fixed official exchange rate overvalued and, hence, raise the black 
market premium.7 The hypotheses to be tested are twofold. First, there is a long-run 
relationship between the parallel and official exchange rates. Second, the parallel market 
premium is determined by foreign exchange policy/controls and by fiscal and monetary 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 With the U.S. being their major trading partners, we use the respective nominal prices of the U.S. dollar in 
each country. 
6 Their per capita incomes were already diverging by mid 1970s. 
7 The premium in effect reflects the shadow price of the control. 
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policy mixes, as measured by changes in base money supply and the central bank credit 
to the government and other fiscal policy proxies.8  
Our empirical strategy for testing the first hypothesis is as follows. First, we test 
for stationarity and integration of the two exchange rate series because this is a pre-
condition for cointegration analysis. Second, having established stationarity and 
integration, we examine the long-run relationship between the two rates by testing for 
cointegration of the two series. Third, we study the direction of causality between the two 
rates by Granger causality test. Theoretically the direction of causation between the two 
rates is indeterminate. If central banks possess proprietary information regarding the state 
of the economy and incorporate this information in setting the official rate, then the 
official rate Granger causes the parallel rate. On the other hand, when exchange rate 
policy is endogenous such as when central banks follow a “premium rule” for setting the 
official rate, then the line of causation is reversed.9 
Our empirical strategy for testing the second hypothesis is as follows. First, we 
transform our data by first differencing because our dependent variable, the parallel 
market premium, and our explanatory variables such as base money supply are (highly 
correlated) time series subject to a common trend/drift.10 Second, we use an array of 
proxies to overcome the relative infrequency with which fiscal data are available;11 the 
                                                 
8 Due to a lack of government bond markets and central bank independence, in developing countries the 
central bank may have no choice but to finance any budget deficits. To the extent that this is the case its 
lending to the government reflects a fiscal policy stance, and to the extent that it chooses to finance a deficit 
its lending reflects a monetary policy stance. Since we do not have the information as to which one is the 
case here, we view the central bank lending to the government and its closely related changes in base 
money supply as a mixture of both fiscal and monetary policy. 
9 Maintaining a target premium by the central bank requires that the official rate be changed when the 
parallel rate changes in which case the parallel rate Granger causes the official rate. 
10 This eliminates any spurious relationship caused by a common trend; see Greene (2000), section 17.4.1. 




exchange rates and monetary data are available on a monthly basis. Our reduced form 
model specifications for the determinants of the parallel market premium are based on 
existing studies (e.g., Kharas and Pinto (1989), Pinto (1991), Ghei et al. (1995), 
Odedokun (1996), and Gelbard and Nagayasu (1999)). For example, our hypothesis that 
an expansionary fiscal-monetary policy mix (budget deficits), as measured by the central 
bank credit to the government, have a positive impact on the premium is supported by 
Ghei et al.’s study of thirty-three developing countries for the period 1976-89. 
As for choice of sample, we focus on three Caribbean countries, Guyana, Jamaica 
and Trinidad for the 1985-1993 period. Our motivation for selecting these countries can 
be explained as follows. These countries had well-developed parallel markets and even 
attempted unification of their parallel and official exchange rates during the sample 
period,12 but existing foreign exchange studies have not considered any of them. As for 
similarities, in 1970 these countries had three things in common.13 First, each had 
attained political independence from Britain in the previous decade. Second, all were 
classified as low-income countries based on pre capita income. Third, in terms of 
exchange rate, all were tied to the pound sterling. But, despite their initial similarities, by 
1975 their per capita incomes were diverging reflecting the difference in their economic 
policies and fortunes and misfortunes.14  
                                                 
12 At the time of the unification in each of these countries the official rate was not viewed as credible and 
was coming under pressure from currency speculators. 
13 In addition, they share English as official language, and Guyana and Trinidad share a strong Indian 
cultural influence due to their initial sizeable immigrants from India. 
14 The discussion of these differences is beyond the scope of this study. It should suffice to note here that 
all three countries had the economic fortunes and misfortunes of mineral exports. Guyana, which had close 
economic ties with the former Soviet Union, bartered her minerals/aluminum for Soviet made consumption 
and capital goods, and as such had an economic decline along with the Soviet Union. Jamaica also exported 
aluminum but mostly to the U.S. whose demand declined in the 1970s with the end of the Vietnam War and 
rose in the 1980s with the Reagan’s military buildup. Trinidad as an oil producer experienced a meteoric 
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As for the sources of our data, we use International Financial Statistics, World 
Currency Yearbook, The Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions, 
and the Ministries of Finance of Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad. We use monthly 
observations for the period 1985-1993. The annual averages of the parallel and official 
exchange rates, the annual average of the parallel market premium and the largest 
premium during each year for the three countries are presented in Tables 1-3. 
 
3. Cointegration and Causality Analysis 
In this section we study the interrelationship between the parallel and official exchange 
rates in our sample by testing for a long-run relationship between the two rates using 
stationarity and cointegration analysis and for the direction of causation between the two 
rates using Granger causality analysis. Our uses of the concepts of stationarity, 
cointegration, and Granger causality in this study are presented below along with the 
respective results.  
The drawback to using non-stationary parallel and official exchange rates series in 
our case would be that the presence of deterministic time trends in the two rates could 
lead us to misinterpret what is essentially a co-movement of the two rates over time for a 
deeper relationship between them.15 There are a number of methods used to test for 
stationarity and the presence of unit roots. The method used here is the Augmented 
                                                                                                                                                 
rise through early 1980s and a fast drop thereafter, a drop that she could not avoid because of a failure to 
diversify its resource-exporting economy before the collapse of world oil prices in mid 1980s. 
15 For a detailed discussion, see Banerjee et al. (1993). 
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Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.16 Using the parallel market rate as an example, we apply this 
technique by positing the equation 
ttct usts +−−+=∆ −1)1( ργµ  
where 1−−=∆ ttt sss , µ  is the drift term and cγ is the coefficient of the deterministic 
time trend t.17 The standard critical values for t-statistics are invalid in testing whether the 
estimated coefficients in this model are statistically different from zero.18 The test is thus 
conducted by comparing the obtained t-values with the relevant ADF statistic. 
The results of our tests for stationarity by applying the ADF procedure to the 
parallel and official exchange rates for the three countries in our study are presented in 
Tables 4- 6.19 s  and e are the logarithm of the parallel and official exchange rates 
respectively and ∆  is the difference operator. Both the parallel and official rates for 
Guyana are stationary in the first difference (Table 4). Both rates for Jamaica are 
stationary in the second difference (Table 5). The two rates for Trinidad are stationary in 
the first difference (Table 6). While testing for and establishing stationarity for the two 
exchange rates in each country does not provide us with any information about the 
interrelationship between them, it does satisfy the pre-conditions for studying this 
relationship. So we can proceed to test for the direction of causality between the two rates 
and for their cointegration.  
We apply the concept of Granger causality by positing the following. Let e~  and 
s~ represent the transformed stationary values of our official and parallel exchange rates 
                                                 
16 We choose this method over information criteria because it is more efficient in testing nested models like 
the ones reported in our Tables 4-6. 
17 We also estimate the nested model with no cγ as well as the one with noµ  or cγ .  
18 The Least squares estimator is biased downward and converges to its probability limit more rapidly. For 
a detailed explanation, see Greene (2002), section 18.3.3. 
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respectively. If lagged values of s~ helps to predict e~ in the presence of lagged values of 
e~ , then the parallel rate s~ is said to Granger cause the official rate e~ . Thus, in the 
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when ts~  Granger causes te~  and there is no reverse Granger causation, then all the k2µ  
coefficients would be statistically equivalent to zero and at least one of the k1θ  
coefficients would be statistically different from zero. The results of our causality 
analysis are presented in Table 7. 
Our causality analysis suggests that causation seems bi-directional in the case of 
Jamaica20 and is uni-directional, with the changes in official rate Granger causing 
changes in the parallel rate, in the cases of Guyana and Trinidad. The difference in their 
lines of causation reflects the difference in their official exchange rate policies. Guyana 
and Trinidad pursued a policy of maintaining the official exchange rate over long periods 
with infrequent and large adjustments. Their parallel rates drifted away and far from their 
official rates for long periods. Jamaica followed the opposite policy of frequent and small 
adjustments in her official rate, and her parallel and official rates moved/changed in close 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 The number of observations in these tables is 107, 106 and 107 respectively. 
20 Our econometric result from Granger test, which is built to detect only uni-directional causality, is 
inconclusive for Jamaica. This result along with information about her official exchange rate policy 
suggests a bi-directional causality between her official and parallel rates. Except for the 1991 unification, 
her central bank was mindful of the black market premium at every step of the way but not to the point of 
following a strict premium rule. If it had followed a premium rule, a uni-directional causality, with changes 
in the parallel rate Granger causing changes in the official rate, would have emerged. The opposite uni-
directional causality between the two rates would have emerged if, as in Guyana and Trinidad, her central 
bank had opted for infrequent and large changes in the official rate independent of the size of the premium 
along the way. The exclusion of this tenuous result would not affect the main points of this paper. 
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lock steps. We can see their difference in Figures 1-3 that graph the logarithmic 
transformation of the parallel and official exchange rates for the three countries. For 
Guyana and Trinidad the graphs of their official exchange rates in Figures 1 and 3 
resemble step functions. For Jamaica the graph of her official exchange rate in Figure 2 
resembles the opposite. Since our causality analysis is done with transformed/differenced 
values of the two rates, it captures more of the short-term dynamics between the two 
rates. 
We now turn to the long-run relationship between the parallel and official 
exchange rates. We use cointegration techniques developed in Johansen (1988, 1991) and 
Johansen and Juselius (1990)21 that are based on Engle and Granger (1987). The 
Johansen method, which is based on the VAR approach,22 is a full information maximum 
likelihood estimation of a system of cointegrating relationships.23 We apply these 
techniques by positing the following. Let tX = ),( ′es  be a vector of k variables which are 
integrated of order 1.24 Then tX  can be written as the 
thp  order VAR25 that with a certain 










ttititt eDXXX  
                                                 
21 This technique was chosen for its ease of use and wide availability in econometric software applications. 
22 The alternative Engle and Granger (1987) method is based on testing whether single-equation estimates 
of the equilibrium errors are stationary. This requires a fully specified long-run equilibrium relationship 
between the dependent variables and respective regressors including a constant, (stationary) exogenous 
variables, and/or a time trend. For details, see Greene (2000), section 18.4. 
23 Johansen and Juselius (1990) developed likelihood ratio tests for structural hypotheses concerning 
cointegrating relationships and their disequilibrium adjustment. 
24 Here k=2. 
25 The order of the VAR, p, is determined in advance. For our variables p=2. 
26 This is a multivariate ECM (Error Correction Model) with explicit distinction between (long-run) 
equilibrium and dynamic adjustments to it. Its transparent display of the cointegrating relationship among 
the variables is of interest here. For details, see Patterson (2000), section 14.4.  
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D and , ),(  is a vector of deterministic components, 
possibly linear trends, constants or seasonal dummies, and te  is k dimensional zero-mean 
random variables with variance matrix Ω .27 If there are r (r<k) independent linear 
combinations of tX that are difference stationary, then tX  is cointegrated of order r. The 
Granger representation theorem in Engle and Granger (1987) shows that if tX  is 
cointegrated of order r then the kk ×  matrix Π  has rank r (r<k)28 and one can write 
'AB=Π  where both A and B are rk ×  matrices of full column rank.29 The algorithm 
developed in Johansen (1988) is essentially a procedure for estimating the above 
relationship subject to the constraint 'AB=Π .  
Our results of applying the Johansen method30 to the parallel and official 
exchange rates data for Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad are presented in Tables 8-10.31 
The first column of the upper panel for each country shows the eigenvalues32 that are 
used to calculate the likelihood ratios presented in the second column,33 which are then 
compared with the critical values in the third column. The fourth column indicates the 
number of cointegrating relationships hypothesized. The first hypothesis ( 0 :0 =rH ) 
                                                 
27 ),...,1( pii =Π is the coefficient of itX − in the original
thp order VAR.  
28 That is,Π has reduced or deficient rank and one of its eigenvalues is zero.    
29 That is, r is also the column dimension of A and B. B’ is the cointegrating vector. A contains the 
adjustment coefficients and B contains the equilibrium/cointegrating coefficients allowing for separate 
representation of the two coefficient sets.  
30 Johansen develops two test statistics for determining the cointegration rank. The first test is known as the 
trace statistics and is the relevant test statistics for the null hypothesis 0rr ≤  against the 
alternative 10 +≥ rr . The second test is the maximum eigenvalue test and improves the power of the test 
by changing the alternative hypothesis to 10 += rr . For details, see Patterson (2000), section 14.4.3.  
31 The number of observations in these tables is 105.  
32 The eigenvalues, v, are obtained by solving the characteristic equation 0=−Π vI ; for details, see 
Patterson (2000), section 14.3.2. They are the largest squared canonical correlations between the level and 
differenced transformation of time series in the VAR; for details, see Greene (2000), section 18.4.3. 
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tests whether the cointegration rank is zero--there is no equilibrium condition that keeps 
the parallel and official exchange rates in proportion to each other in the long run. This 
hypothesis is rejected for the three countries in our sample. The second hypothesis 
( 1 :0 ≤rH ) tests whether the cointegration rank is less than or equal to one.
34 The data 
failed to reject this hypothesis for any of the three countries. The unnormalized and 
normalized estimated cointegrating coefficients for the two exchange rates are presented 
in the middle and lower panels of Tables 8-10, with the respective standard errors listed 
in parentheses. 
Our cointegration analysis also suggests that over the sample period there are 
large disparities between the parallel and official exchange rates in Guyana and Trinidad; 
the normalized coefficients for their parallel rates are -2.35 and -2.74 respectively. On the 
average their official rates were maintained at 42% and 36% of their respective parallel 
rates.35 The data for Jamaica on the other hand reveal a small disparity between her two 
exchange rates in the order of 6%. These results reflect once again the fact that the 
official exchange rate in Guyana and Trinidad was adjusted infrequently and by large 
amounts as opposed to the frequent and small changes in the official exchange rate in 
Jamaica.  
 
4. Determinants of the Parallel Market Premium 
In this section we study the determinants of the parallel market premium for our sample. 
We estimate the impact of foreign exchange controls and fiscal and monetary policy on 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 Large values provide evidence against the hypothesis of r or fewer cointegrating vectors. 
34 Given the null hypothesis of the cointegtration rank being zero is rejected, the cointegration rank equals 
one. 
35 The respective figure for Jamaica is about 95%. 
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the parallel market premium using reduced form regression models and monthly data for 
the period 1985-1993.36 To control for inflation we use inflation-adjusted values for the 
respective variables. To account for any inertia in the premium (denoted by “s-p”), we 
use its own past values as explanatory variables. We also account for country specific 
government (export) revenues for Guyana (from Bauxite) and for Trinidad (from oil). 
As for foreign exchange policy/control, the policy tools used vary from country to 
country. To control for the difference in these policies and their likely impact on the 
parallel market premium, we consider the following three foreign exchange policy tools. 
We consider capital controls (denoted by “CapCon”), which are restrictions on payments 
for capital transactions. These restrictions apply exclusively to resident-owned funds. We 
consider current account restrictions (denoted by “Currac”), which are restrictions on 
payments for current account transactions. Governments in developing countries have 
typically enforced current account restrictions because current account transactions can 
be used to evade restrictions on capital transactions.37 Finally, we consider the existence 
of multiple official exchange rates (denoted by “Multiple”), which are different fixed 
exchange rates for capital and current account transactions.38 Jamaica did not use any of 
these restrictions in the sample period. Guyana utilized all three forms of restrictions, and 
Trinidad utilized only current account restrictions. These foreign exchange policy 
variables are dummy variables taking a value of one during the period in which they are 
                                                 
36 By using lagged values of these policies we circumvent the issue of their endogeneity. 
37 By, among others, under invoicing exports and over invoicing imports. 
38 In such a case, the premium should be calculated as the difference between the black market rate and a 
weighted average of the various official rates. However, the respective data for various official transactions 
are generally unavailable, and for developing countries the readily available and prominent official rate for 
current account transactions is usually used to calculate the foreign exchange premium. For Guyana we 
include a dummy variable for her use of multiple official rates to compensate for the imperfection of her 
calculated premium.  
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enforced and zero otherwise. They are constructed from The Annual Report on Exchange 
Rate Arrangements and Restrictions published by the IMF. 
Regarding fiscal and monetary policy, we use the following variables and 
proxies.39 We use the central bank lending to the government (denoted by “Credit”) as a 
measure of the part of the budget deficit covered in this manner.40 This variable provides 
some indication about the ability of the central government to finance its current 
expenditures from its current revenues, but does not fully reflect its fiscal policy stance. 
To the extent that the central bank independently chooses, as opposed to being forced, to 
lend to the government, this variable reflects the monetary policy stance as well. Since 
the two types of lending by the central bank cannot be distinguished, this variable is 
viewed to reflect the fiscal and monetary policy mix.41 Where data for the central bank 
lending to the government are unavailable, as in the case of Guyana, we use the closely 
related changes in the (real) base money supply—the notes and coins component of 
money supply (denoted by “m-p”). To the extent that inflation reflects (excessive) 
lending to the government and (excessive) expansion in the money supply,42 we use past 
inflation rates, as in the case of Jamaica, to capture any additional impact on the premium 
of the fiscal and monetary policy that is not already accounted for.43  
Governments can differ in their fiscal/economic policy orientation. Hence, 
changes of government create uncertainty that can affect the parallel market premium. In 
the absence of monthly fiscal data and to control for the possible inability of the central 
                                                 
39 Use of these variables circumvents the limitation that data on government expenditures and revenues are 
not available at monthly intervals and that fiscal policy is not made on a monthly base. 
40 In developing countries usually entire fiscal deficits are monetized because markets for government 
securities are very thin or non-existent altogether. 
41 This was noted also in a footnote in section 2. 
42 “Excessive” is defined relative to the real growth of the economy. 
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bank lending to the government to capture changes in fiscal policy orientation, we use a 
variable “Elections”, a dummy variable taking a value of one six months prior to and 
after a general election and zero otherwise, in our estimated specification. Our decision to 
use six months prior to a general election as the measurement period is based on the 
observation that during the sample period there was on average a difference of six months 
between the announcement and holding of general elections. Our choice of six months 
after a general election as the measurement period is based on the average time difference 
between the holding of general elections and the passing of annual budgets. Radical 
changes in government as in the case of Jamaica can be expected to cause extreme 
uncertainty and, hence, affect the parallel market premium in a pronounced way. To 
capture this impact we include a variable “Change of Government” (denoted by 
“Changov”) in our specification for Jamaica. Like our variable “Elections”, this variable 
is a dummy variable taking a value of one six months prior to and after the inauguration 
of a new government.  
Given the importance of bauxite exports and oil exports for the government 
revenues in Guyana and Trinidad respectively, we include them (denoted by “Export” 
and “Oil Revenues”) in our respective reduced form regression models. The Guyana’s 
bauxite industry, which was nationalized in the sample period, accounted for more than 
75% of her export earnings and government revenues. The Trinidad’s oil industry 
accounted for more than 80% of her export earnings and government revenues. 
International Financial Statistics publishes the data for our first, second, sixth and 
                                                                                                                                                 
43 The inclusion of this variable for Jamaica captures significant additional information about her black 
market premium even in the presence of the variable “credit”.  
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seventh variables and the Ministry of Finance in each country publishes the data for our 
third, fourth and fifth variables. 
 The results of estimating our reduced form models of determinants of the parallel 
market premium in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad are presented in Tables 11-13.44 The t-
statistics values for the estimated coefficients are presented in parenthesis. The related 
elasticities, which are evaluated at the mean of the respective independent variable, are 
reported as well. The marginal effects that are reported in Tables 11-13 represent the net 
effect of the binary variables used in the analysis. Table 14 reports the battery of 
diagnostic tests used to evaluate each estimated model. The R2 is the standard coefficient 
of determination; the F(m,n) is the standard F test;  and the DW is the standard Durbin-
Watson statistic for serial correlation. AR1-5 is a test of residual autocorrelation. The null 
hypothesis for this test is that the lagged values of the residuals have coefficients equal to 
zero. The RESET is Ramsey's RESET Test of specification errors. Specification errors as 
used in this format cover the correlation between the independent regressors and the 
residual term, omitted variables and errors in the functional forms used in generating the 
estimates. The Normality test reported is the Jarque-Bera test of normality of the 
residuals; the null hypothesis is normality. The final diagnostic test listed is the ARCH 
[m]; the null hypothesis of this test is that the residual term is conditionally 
homoscedastic. The results in Table 14 indicate that the overall fits of the estimated 
regressions are satisfactory.  
There are broad similarities as well as striking differences in the specifics in the 
behavior of the parallel market premium in the three countries. As for any inertia in the 
                                                 
44 The number of observations in these tables is 102. 
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premium, its past values have a dampening effect on its current values in all three 
countries.45 
As for the role of foreign exchange controls,46 in Guyana current account 
restrictions have a large negative impact on the premium. The presence of such 
restrictions two periods earlier dampens the premium in current period by over 17%. In 
Trinidad current account restrictions create small but opposite effects over time. One 
period after their introduction these controls lead to an increase of 1.4% in the premium, 
while four periods after their introduction they lead to a reduction of 1.55% in the 
premium. This result shows that initially current account restrictions are ineffective in 
dampening the parallel market premium but over time they become binding and lead to a 
reduction in the premium.47 In Guyana capital controls have the opposite effect. The 
presence of such controls in previous period results in a startling 24% increase in the 
premium in current period. Her use of multiple exchange rates also has a significant 
positive impact on the premium. To the extent that an increase in the premium is 
indicative of excess demand for foreign exchange in the parallel market, these results 
suggest that in Guyana capital controls and multiple exchange rates are effective tools in 
reducing the flow of foreign exchange into the parallel market. 
As for the role of fiscal and monetary policy, the central bank credit to the 
government has a positive effect on the parallel market premium in Jamaica and Trinidad 
for which such data are available. Its impact is somewhat greater in Trinidad where the 
                                                 
45 For Guyana the estimated elasticity, which is significant at the 1% level, implies that a 1% increase in the 
premium two months earlier would result in a startling/implausible 36.8% reduction in the premium in 
current period. 
46 To the extent that market participants may have expectations about controls being imposed or relaxed, 
our model specification reflects a reduced form. It is in the tradition of the existing studies noted in sections 
1 and 2 that we interpret its estimated coefficients structurally.  
47 Interestingly, this is similar to the J-curve effect but with reversed causation. 
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five-period (five-month) lag of the central bank credit to the government, which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, has an estimated elasticity of 0.858. The 
respective elasticity for Jamaica is 0.655. In Guyana, where data for the central bank 
lending to the government are unavailable, changes in (real) base money have a 
significant positive impact on the parallel market premium.48 A 1% increase in her (real) 
base money supply in previous period implies a 6.89% increase in her premium in current 
period. Finally, in Jamaica a 1% increase in the inflation rate three periods earlier results 
in a startling increase of over 37% in the premium in current period. These results 
confirm the notion that budget deficits and expansionary fiscal and monetary policy put 
upward pressure on the exchange rate.  
Elections have a positive impact on the premium in Guyana and Jamaica. Its 
impact is stronger in Guyana where an election in the previous period leads to a 4.37% 
increase in the premium in current period. The respective elasticity for Jamaica is 1.3%. 
Elections have no explanatory power in the case of Trinidad. Radical changes of 
government in Jamaica have positive and statistically significant impact on her premium; 
such a change of government two periods earlier leads to a 2.4% increase in her premium 
in current period. These results confirm the notion that changes of government, be it 
orderly or violently, result in uncertainty, albeit to different degrees, and lead to a rise in 
the parallel market premium.  
As for government (export) revenues a la’ bauxite exports in Guyana and oil 
exports in Trinidad we expect them to have a negative impact on the premium. The signs 
of the respective estimated coefficients are in line with our a-priori expectations, but the 
                                                 
48 This variable has no explanatory power in the other two countries where data for the central bank lending 
to the government are available and are already present in the estimations. 
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one for Guyana is statistically insignificant and the one for Trinidad while statistically 
significant has a very small elasticity. 
Putting aside the past values of the premium, in Guyana capital controls, in 
Jamaica, which did not use any exchange controls, inflation, and in Trinidad current 
account restrictions exert the strongest influence on the parallel market premium. That is, 
exchange controls, when used, are the strongest determinants of the premium. 
 
5. Conclusions  
In this paper we have studied the relationship between the parallel and official exchange 
rates for a sample of three Caribbean countries, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad for the 
period 1985-1993 using Granger causality, cointegration, and reduced form methods on 
monthly data. These countries had well-developed parallel markets and attempted 
unification of their parallel and official exchange rates during the sample period. The fact 
that they were fundamentally similar at the onset of their political independence in the 
1960s but faced different economic policies and fortunes/misfortunes soon thereafter has 
rendered this sample further interesting.  
Our cointegration and causality analyses have revealed once again the importance 
of the official exchange rate policy pursued by the central bank for the relationship 
between the official and parallel rates. Where the official rate was adjusted infrequently 
and by large amounts as in Guyana and Trinidad the official rate Granger caused the 
parallel rate and there were significant disequilibria in the relationship between the two 
rates over the sample period. Where the official rate was adjusted frequently and by small 
amounts as in Jamaica the official and parallel rates exhibited bi-directional causation and 
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there was an equilibrium/long-run relationship between the two rates over the sample 
period.49  
The results of our reduced form regression models have mostly confirmed the 
notions that expansionary fiscal and monetary policy, changes of government, and 
exchange controls in the forms of capital controls and multiple exchange rates put 
upward pressure on the exchange rate and, where the official rate is protected, increase 
the parallel market premium. The negative impact on the premium of current account 
restrictions in Guyana and Trinidad suggests that in certain cases such restrictions could 
be effective in curbing demand for foreign products/currency, albeit with a delay and in a 
J-curve fashion. The insignificant and small negative impact on the premium of country 
specific government (export) revenues a la’ bauxite exports in Guyana and oil exports in 
Trinidad reveal that such foreign exchange earnings may be ineffective in removing the 
pressure on the official rate caused by, for example, monetaized budget deficits.  
The fact that in our sample, after past values of the premium, exchange controls 
exert the strongest impact on the premium once again reveals the pivotal role of such 
controls for the emergence and behavior of parallel markets for foreign exchange. Given 
their strong impact on the premium, to minimize the distortions caused by them they can 
be accompanied by an active policy of frequent and small adjustments to the official rate 
as in Jamaica and a la’ a “premium rule” rather than by a passive policy of infrequent and 
large adjustments to the official rate as in Guyana and Trinidad. Our analysis further 
supports the lesson that policy makers cannot play foot loose with fiscal and monetary 
                                                 
49 These results make one wonder if an exchange rate unification attempt may have a higher chance for 
success where the latter official exchange rate policy is followed. 
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policy without its consequence showing up somewhere else in the economy. In our case, 
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Table 1: Guyana-Exchange Rates and Premium 
Year Official Exchange Rate Parallel Exchange Rate Premium (%) Maximum Premium (%)
1985 4.24 28.92 684.04 843.37 
1986 4.28 43.75 1019.87 1209.3 
1987 10.00 51.33 513.33 540.00 
1988 10.00 50.75 507.5 530.00 
1989 27.25 55.75 263.03 550.00 
1990 40.00 85.08 213.52 233.33 
1991 114.15 161.42 47.17 244.44 
1992 125.13 167.92 34.22 141.13 




Table 2: Jamaica-Exchange Rates and Premium 
Year Official Exchange Rate Parallel Exchange Rate Premium (%) Maximum Premium (%)
1985 5.56 6.27 12.77 19.8 
1986 5.48 6.52 18.99 21.77 
1987 5.49 6.34 15.48 18.36 
1988 5.49 6.57 19.67 22.16 
1989 5.74 7.32 27.53 34.52 
1990 7.18 9.48 32.03 43.89 
1991 12.12 16.33 34.74 76.12 
1992 22.96 25.28 10.11 13.72 




Table 3: Trinidad and Tobago-Exchange Rates and Premium 
 Year Official Exchange Rate Parallel Exchange Rate Premium (%) Maximum Premium (%)
1985 2.5 3.96 58.4 66.67 
1986 3.6 4.76 32.0 46.39 
1987 3.6 4.71 31.0 40.28 
1988 3.9 5.88 52.0 58.33 
1989 4.25 6.62 56.0 62.35 
1990 4.25 6.07 43.0 57.65 
1991 4.25 5.64 33.0 40.47 
1992 4.25 4.95 17.0 23.53 






Table 4: Guyana-Unit Root Tests 
 
 s∆  e∆  ADF 
)1( ρ−  -1.02 -0.948  
t-value (-4.792) (-4.37) -2.586 
)1(, ρµ −  0.0193, -1.254 0.0385, -1.152  
t-value (2.043), (-5.258) (2.07), (-4.899) -3.495 
cγρµ ),1(, −  0.0306, -1.286, 0.0002 0.0461, 0.236, -0.00013  
t-value (1.551), (-5.264), (-0.6545) (1.224), (-4.879), (-0.232) -4.05 
 
Table 5: Jamaica-Unit Root Tests 
 
 s
2∆  e2∆  ADF 
)1( ρ−  -3.849 -2.338  
t-value (-9.385) (-6.559) -2.586 
)1(, ρµ −  0.00077, -3.85 0.000747, -2.3404  
t-value (0.1299), (9.337) (0.199), (6.529) -3.495 
cγρµ ),1(, −  0.00056, -3.85, 6108.3 −×  -0.0022, -2.35, 51018.5 −×   
t-value (0.042), (-9.285), (0.0186) (-0.0265), (-6.512), (0.398) -4.05 
 
Table 6: Trinidad-Unit Root Tests 
 
 s∆  e∆  ADF 
)1( ρ−  -1.316 -1.009  
t-value (-5.543) (-4.3696) -2.586 
)1(, ρµ −  0.00639, -1.3715 0.01, (-1.1648)  
t-value (1.115), (-5.6498) (1.758), (-4.753) -3.495 
cγρµ ),1(, −  0.0153, -1.3955, -0.00016 0.01546, -1.176, 51036.9 −×−   
t-value (1.228), (-5.69538),  (-0.8046) 









Table 7: Granger Causality Tests 
Country se ∆→∆ F-value es ∆→∆ F-value
Guyana Yes 2.08 no 0.32 
Jamaica Yes 5.48 yes 4.61 




Table 8: Guyana-Cointegrating Equations 
 




Table 9: Jamaica-Cointegrating Equations 
 



















H0: 1≤r  


































H0: 1≤r  


















Table 10: Trinidad-Cointegrating Equations 
 






Table 11: Guyana-Reduced Form Estimates 
Variables Coefficient Elasticities Marginal Effects 





1−tElection   1.9879 
(2.479) 
 4.37 0.4373 
2−tCurrac   -1.886 
(-6.893) 
17.16 1.716 
1−tCapCon   3.122 
(7.6556) 
24.35 2.435 
1−tMultiple   0.8387 
(5.273) 
 6.542 0.654 
2)( −−∆ tps   -0.6201 
(-8.815) 
36.848  
5)( −−∆ tps   -0.6325 
(-6.008) 
 0.661  
1)( −−∆ tpm   0.0191 
(2.686) 
 6.889  
2−∆ tExport   -0.0028 
(-0.5531 





















H0: 1≤r  


















Table 12: Jamaica-Reduced Form Estimates 
Variables Coefficient Elasticities Marginal Effects 





5−tElections   0.0013 
(2.479) 
 1.303 0.23 
2−tChangov   0.00362 
(2.99) 
 2.419 0.284 
2)( −−∆ tps   -0.1698 
(-4.4358) 
12.542  
5)( −−∆ tps   -0.3922 
(-5.51) 
 4.279  
4−∆ tCredit   0.0101 
(2.446) 
 0.65536  







Table 13: Trinidad-Reduced Form Estimates 
Variables Coefficient Elasticities Marginal Effects 





1−tElection   -1.156 
(-0.761) 














1)( −−∆ tps   -0.5377 
(-3.622) 
 0.08  
3)( −−∆ tps   -0.2644 
(-2.66) 
 0.02  
2−∆ tCredit   0.0151 
(3.676) 
 0.009  
5−∆ tCredit   0.0113 
(3.137) 
 0.858  
1-tRevenues Oil∆   -0.5999 
(-2.892) 





Table 14: Reduced Form Diagnostics 
Diagnostics Guyana Jamaica Trinidad 
R^2  0.59  0.56 0.46 
F(8.91) 16.36 16.9 9.6 
DW  1.89  1.94 1.94 
AR 1-5 [0.871] [0.583] [0.786] 
RESET [0.873] [0.671] [0.655] 
Normality [0.873] [0.477] [0.18] 
ARCH (4) [0.83] [0.644] [0.438] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
